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FRAUDITOR LOSES YET ANOTHER LAWSUIT

What's up, everybody? I hope you guys are doing fantastic. So, on today's video, we have some breaking news. The frauditor Lana Patrick, aka Mark White, has lost yet another lawsuit. Now, what's happening is that a few years ago, she took a course from the Professor George Metz School of Law, and unfortunately, now we're seeing that that advice was pretty much garbage because she's losing all her lawsuits. Now, what's even worse is that in another lawsuit, she's also facing attorney fees. I will keep you guys updated on that, but for now, we'll talk about this lawsuit. This ruling occurred yesterday. Now, this is very important because yes, it's funny to see frauditors getting arrested. They cry about a broken shoulder. Haha, that's really funny. But what happens after? What happens when they file lawsuits against the government, which cost taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars? It's really important to follow up on that. So, today, you're going to see that the judge completely tore apart Lana. Basically, Lana was saying that the public forum doctrine doesn't even apply, doesn't matter. She was proven wrong. She was proven wrong about qualified immunity. Overall, she got completely torn apart, and she's probably going to have to pay some attorney fees for this lawsuit as well. With that being said, enjoy the video. Order this cause is before this court on defendant Lieutenant Merz's motion to dismiss, defendant John/Jane Doe's motion to dismiss, and plaintiff Lana Patrick's responses thereto. For the following reasons, the motions will be granted. One, on August 29th, 2022, plaintiff Lana Patrick, an independent journalist and activist, was at the Clay County Utilities Authority, CCUA, to record public employees. As alleged, plaintiff was walking through public areas of the building, including the grounds, to look through open windows and record working employees. At some point, plaintiff purportedly was accosted by two men for pressing the security boundaries of the building. Plaintiff returned to the lobby, but defendant Lieutenant Martz, a deputy of the Clay County Sheriff's Office, asked plaintiff to leave under the threat of arrest. As a result, plaintiff brings four claims for violation of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983 against defendants Martz and John/Jane Doe, an unidentified individual employed by the CCUA. See generally Idea. The court struck plaintiff's first two complaints as shotgun pleadings. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, which defendants moved to dismiss. Two. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 A 2. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 B 6, a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 B 6 challenges the facial sufficiency of the statement of claim for relief. Brooks versus Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Incorporated. This motion is viewed with disfavor and rarely granted. In adjudicating a Rule 12 B 6 motion, a court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. C United Tech Corp versus Mazer. The pleading must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corporation versus Twombly. This requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. at 555. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft versus Iqbal. However, the tenant that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. three. Defendants argue that the second amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because it constitutes a shotgun pleading, and alternatively, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant John/Jane Doe further argues that dismissal is appropriate because it is a fictitious party and service of process was not effectuated. As a general matter, the failure to identify claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a shotgun pleading. Beckwith versus BellSouth Telecoms, Inc. Shotgun pleadings wreak havoc on the judicial system and divert already stretched judicial resources into disputes that are not structurally prepared to use those resources efficiently. Wagner versus First Horizon Farm Corp. The 11th Circuit has identified shotgun pleadings as those that one, contain multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts. Two, do not re-allege all the preceding counts, but are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action. Three, do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into separate counts. Or four, in a multi-defendant action, contain counts that present a claim for relief without specifying which defendants the claim is brought against. Saran versus Miami Dade College. This court begins with the claims against Mertz. Plaintiff asserts only eight factual allegations in total. According to Mertz, the allegations lack the appropriate detail to present a valid legal claim. In part, due to plaintiff's failure to incorporate her eight allegations into the claims in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 A2 and 10 B. This court disagrees. A dismissal under Rules 8 A2 and 10 B is appropriate where it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claims for relief. The complaint is short and direct, totaling five pages. And Mertz's purported conduct is clearly stated. She asked plaintiff to leave the property and threatened plaintiff with arrest upon a failure to do so. The factual allegations are numbered in short paragraphs and pertain to a single set of events in compliance with Rule 10 B. The claims against Mertz, separated into different counts, are also clear. In count one, plaintiff asserts violation of the First Amendment for unlawfully trespassing her from a publicly accessible area of a public building. And in count two, plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim for exercising her First Amendment right to free press. As to the lack of incorporation of factual allegations, Rule 10c provides the option to adopt allegations by reference, but does not mandate it. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10c. A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading. Whether the complaint survives a Rule 12b6 analysis is a separate matter. See Wyllie at 1325, distinguishing between a Rule 12b6 analysis and proper pleading under Rules 8a2 and 10b. Viewing the complaint as whole, Mertz is put on sufficient notice of the claims against her. See Carter versus Duval County, concluding that the complaint containing eight numbered paragraphs, where each claim was not separated into a different count, did not constitute a shotgun pleading. Nonetheless, counts one and two will be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. The qualified immunity defense shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Corbett versus Vickers. The parties do not appear to dispute the initial question of whether Mertz performed a discretionary function when she allegedly asked plaintiff to leave the property. Plaintiff now bears the burden of showing that one, the defendant violated a constitutional right, and two, that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions. Donald versus Norris. Construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she fails to do so. As to the first prong, plaintiff contends that by asking her to leave the CCUA building, Merits violated her supposed First Amendment right to record public personnel on public property. Two, Merits argues that the CCUA is not a public forum, and plaintiff has no unfettered right of access to the building, and has no right to record therein. In response, plaintiff claims the CCUA's forum status is immaterial because no law criminalizes recording where there is no expectation of privacy. Since there is no restriction on filming in the public areas, the forum doctrine does not even warrant a mention in this case. The fact that the area open to the public is a limited or non-public forum means absolutely nothing. Plaintiff's argument fails for three reasons. First, the absence of a criminal law prohibiting conduct does not establish a constitutional right to the conduct. Second, to whatever extent plaintiff argues otherwise, there is no right to unfettered access to public property to record public personnel. While the First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically a right to record matters of public interest, Smith versus City of Coming, 2000, the right is subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions in Ditto. And third, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the CCUA's forum status is pertinent to an analysis of whether Merits violated plaintiff's supposed First Amendment right. Time, place, and manner restrictions implicate a forum analysis. See Ward versus Rock Against Racism. Our cases make clear that even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech. Plaintiff is no stranger to rules of proper pleading, having previously initiated several cases based on similar facts. See, for example, Patrick versus Fassano, Patrick versus Maguire. However, neither plaintiff's complaint nor response provides this court with sufficient facts to conduct a forum analysis. Much less does the complaint plead facts from which this court could infer that CCUA property is a public forum of any sort. Therefore, the complaint does not allege facts that would warrant an inference that plaintiff has any First Amendment right to do what she did. Plaintiff cites a video exhibit of the alleged events, but this court has not received a video. In contrast, the court in Patrick versus Maguire supplemented with more detailed allegations and a video capturing all events, including the policy restricting recording in the building, was able to conduct a thorough analysis of plaintiff's claims. While the operative complaint survives a shotgun analysis, it does not withstand a qualified immunity analysis. See Watkins, the proper inquiry is whether the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Because plaintiff fails to carry her burden, counts one and two will be dismissed. See St. George versus Pinellas County. Once an officer has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden of persuasion on that issue is on the plaintiff. As to counts three and four against defendant John/Jane Doe, this court will grant John/Jane Doe's motion to dismiss. It is unclear from the complaint who John/Jane Doe is, or for what specific conduct he or she is liable. Three, plaintiff lists the individual as a CCUA employee, but the statement of facts is devoid of any allegation pertaining to John {slash} Jane Doe. See paragraphs 5 to 12. And counts three and four against the individual state only that he or she violated plaintiff's rights by having her unlawfully removed from a place she had a right to be in and report on. According to plaintiff's response, John {slash} Jane Doe is the CCUA's proper owner or a person authorized by the owner to remove an individual from the property. A Florida trespass statute prohibiting an individual's presence on a property after the owner or otherwise authorized person asked the individual to leave provides the sole basis for plaintiff's allegation of this defendant's existence. However, the 11th Circuit has clearly stated that fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court. New versus Sports N' Recreation Incorporated. See also Richardson versus Johnson. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish New versus Sports N' Recreation Incorporated from the instant action, arguing that unlike this case, the plaintiff in New wasn't asserting a claim against a person who directly violated her rights. This argument is meritless, and plaintiff cites no authority in support. The 11th Circuit has affirmed dismissals of claims for fictitious party pleading that alleges a direct violation of rights. See, for example, Richardson at 738, affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against John Doe, guard, Charlotte Correctional Institution, due fictitious party pleading, where John Doe allegedly denied plaintiff medical treatment. As a result, plaintiff failed to properly effectuate service upon John / Jane Doe, which is essential to this court's jurisdiction. See Pardazi versus Coleman Medical. Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement. A court lacks jurisdiction over the person of a defendant when that defendant has not been served. A fictitious name, when the real defendant cannot be readily identified for service, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action. Bielma versus Greweler. Despite being provided with two opportunities to amend her complaint, plaintiff alleges no identifiable information or facts pertaining to John / Jane Doe, failed to properly effectuate service, and fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, all claims will be dismissed with prejudice. See Garcia versus Chiquita Brands. In light of the foregoing, it is ordered one, defendant Lieutenant Mertens' motion to dismiss, document 27, and defendant John / Jane Doe's motion to dismiss, document 30, are granted. Two, the second amended complaint, document 26, is dismissed with prejudice. Three, the clerk is directed to terminate any other pending motions and close this case. Done and ordered in Jacksonville, Florida on February 9th, 2026. So, there you have it, another frivolous lawsuit from a frauditor, and another frivolous lawsuit dismissed. Thank you so much for watching. Don't forget to subscribe, and I'll see you guys on the next one.