On June 16th, 2025, defendant Andrew Kosis was charged in the St. Joseph Superior Court with felony counts of theft and obstruction of justice and a misdemeanor charge of fraud. The state's case against Mr. Kosis relied on evidence that was obtained by Indiana State Police Sergeant Jeremy Bryce while extracting and reviewing data on Mr. Kosas' phone pursuant to a valid warrant. Sergeant Price reported that while reviewing the phone's contents, he inadvertently came across material that was damaging to Mr. Kosis, but also outside the scope of the warrant. Mr. Kosis moved to suppress the evidence, and Sergeant Price testified as a central witness at the suppression hearing. On January 22nd, 2026, Judge David Francisco denied the motion to suppress and ruled the evidence admissible. On February 9th, 2026, Mr. Kossus filed a motion to dismiss for alleged due process violations. On May 1st, the matter came before Judge Francisco for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss. Mr. Kosis was represented by attorney Donald Schmidt and the state was represented by special prosecuting attorney James Lutil. Because the defense had brought the motion and bore the burden of proof, Mr. Schmid called Sergeant Bryce to testify on direct examination. >> Sergeant Bryce, why don't we have you come on up, sir? Go ahead and pause real quickly. Raise your right hand. You swear affirm under the pains and penalties for perjury that the testimony you give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. >> Have a seat, please. >> Mr. Schmid, you can proceed, sir. >> Thank you. Thank you, your honor. Good morning, Sergeant Bryce. >> Good morning. >> By whom are you employed? >> I'm employed with the Indiana State Police. >> And since when have you been employed by the Indiana State Police? >> As a sworn officer since uh May 1st of 2014. >> How many times have you been sued in court in your life? >> Um I've received a legal filing once. I've never to the point where I went to court to testify on it, but just once. >> So, you've been sued in court once, correct? >> Yes. I I don't necessarily understand exactly what you mean by that, but um I have been have a civil suit filed against me. Yes. >> Let me ask it this way. How many times have you been named as a defendant in a lawsuit? >> Uh once, as far as I know. >> And was that in federal court? >> Yes, it was. >> And was that in a lawsuit brought by a Steven Heck? >> Yes. >> Okay. And was that lawsuit filed in March of 2023? >> I received notification of it in August of 23. I don't know the exact date it was filed. Um, this was a copy of this was digitally emailed to me um, August 11th of 2023 by our legal division. >> Did you review this uh, complaint in federal court when you received it? >> I did. Do you know whether or not an answer to that complaint was filed on your behalf in that federal court action? Uh I was advised at the time that I received it that our legal division would be providing defense to the attorney general. So they would be handling that civil suit on my behalf >> doing some interrogatories or questions from the plaintiff in the case. >> Yes. >> And did you provide answers to those questions? I did. >> And did you sign the answers to those questions under oath? >> I believe I don't have a copy of that interrogatory form in front of me, but I believe I would have signed um the bottom of that form. >> Did you also review requests for documents from the plaintiff in that case that were provided to you by the state police or council for the state police? Uh there interrogatories and there was a summary judgement declaration that I filled out, but those are the only two documents that I recall ever reviewing and and responding to. >> Did you get a copy of the motions for summary judgement in the federal lawsuit against you? >> No. >> Were you informed at some point, Sergeant Bryce, of the court's ruling on the pending summary judgement motions for which you had submitted a declaration? Uh, no I was not. >> You were not informed? >> The last uh communication I had with the attorney general would have been in June of 2025 when I asked for like a status update and I was told that it was still pending, but up until um these court proceedings, I was unaware of the outcome. >> Okay. So, you you did have communication about the case in 2025 and specifically June of 2025. Correct. >> Correct. Do you recall you gave a deposition in this case on October 27, 2025? >> Correct. >> Have any complaints been filed against you while you have been an Indiana State Police officer? >> If we're referring to internal investigations, as I um believed you had meant during the deposition, then the answer is still no. >> No, I didn't refer to internal investigations. My question was simply, have any complaints been filed against you while you've been an Indiana State Police officer? >> Um, knowing what I know now with the complaint form of the inmate being filed and that being obly recalled to memory, then I will answer yes. >> And the complaint that was filed against you in federal court was a complaint filed against you while you're an Indiana State Police officer. Correct. >> Uh, it was on an in complaint form. So, yes. And in fact, it was a complaint that led to a lawsuit in federal court. Correct. >> It did. >> And you had to have an answer or an answer was filed on your behalf. Correct. >> It was. >> You had to answer interrogatories. Correct. >> Correct. >> You had to supply documents to counsel to respond to that lawsuit. Correct. >> That is correct. >> And you even had to supply a declaration under oath in connection with a pending legal motion in connection with that lawsuit. Correct. That is correct. Your honor, that's all I had for this witness. >> Mr. Schmid questioned Sergeant Bryce about a federal civil lawsuit that had been filed against him, establishing that Sergeant Price had been named as a defendant in an action brought by inmate Steven Hec on March 9th, 2023. The complaint alleged that Sergeant Price had conducted a warrantless search of Mr. Hec's cell phone in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, an allegation that resembled the cell phone search issue in Mr. Kosas' own case. Sergeant Price acknowledged that he had reviewed the complaint, that an answer had been filed on his behalf, that he had answered written interrogatories under oath, and that he had submitted a sworn declaration in connection with the litigation. At a deposition for the Kosis case conducted on October 27th, 2025, roughly two weeks before the suppression hearing, Sergeant Bryce gave sworn testimony. And when he was asked whether any complaints had been filed against him while he was an Indiana State Police officer, he answered that he had received no formal complaints. The defense's position is that this answer was false because the HEC lawsuit was itself a complaint filed against Sergeant Bryce during his service as an officer. Thank you. On October 27th of 2025, you did sit for a deposition as you have acknowledged on direct exam. Is that correct? >> Yes. >> Did you testify truthfully? >> I did. >> Were you asked during that deposition if any if you had ever been sued in your capacity as a law enforcement officer? >> I was not. You answered the question about complaints and and the question was phrased any complaints made while you've been an Indiana State Police officer. You took that to be a question. >> Yes. >> And your response was, "No, I've had no formal complaints." >> That is correct. >> And how did you understand the question that Mr. Schmid posed to you? >> I took it as kind of a a vague question. Um, but I perceived it to be that it was asking about any internal affairs types investigations or or inquiries to our internal affairs division. Uh, to which my answer was no formal complaints. >> And have you had any formal complaints brought against you within that system as you understood the question? >> No, I have not. >> And why did you understand the question that way? >> I don't recall exactly why. I mean, it's been uh a while ago, but um I will say it was towards the end of the deposition. Um, there's obviously a little bit of question fatigue that that sets in eventually. I took it to mean, you know, any complaints made. I could have I guess assumed, you know, any complaints made while I've been an Indianapolis state police officer could have meant have I made any complaints, which obviously would not really make sense in the the context of the deposition. Um, and so that's why I took that as any complaints made being, have I received any, you know, formal complaints, any complaints that would uh be referred to our uh internal affairs investigation as a a pre-inquiry or a true investigation. And I'm sure that when I arrest people and take them to jail that they may complain the handcuffs are on too tight or uh when I've taken people to to written speeding tickets to them, they've shown them to court. you know, that would be technically a complaint because they're complaining that I stopped them for speeding and they were taking it to court. But that wasn't the context of what the the deposition was, at least in my mind. And so in my mind, I took that as a internal affairs complaint, not just complaints to the uh degree that meant a very wide scope. >> The follow-up question by Mr. Schmidt, any discipline imposed, and you stated no. >> That is correct. >> And was that a true answer? That was um I believe it also kind of reaffirmed that I understood his question uh at least how I took his question to mean. >> What do you mean? Explain that to the court. How did the follow-up question reaffirm your understanding of the earlier question? >> Anytime we have a an intro investigation that does result in um a founded allegation, you know, there would be disciplinary action, whether that's a verbal counseling or days off or administrative discipline. And since I received none of those, they kind of reaffirmed that that's what he meant was, you know, an internal affairs type investigation. >> I have no further questions, your honor. Mr. Schmid, >> thank you, your honor. >> Sergeant Bryce, can you point to the part of the question on page 51 when you were asked about whether any complaints been made against you while an Indiana State Police Officer? Can you point to any part of that question that refers to internal affairs? >> Um, there is no portion. >> And to be clear, you did understand the allegation that was being made by Mr. Heckey against the state police and against you specifically in the federal lawsuit. Correct. Uh, I didn't recognize it at the time, but I do recognize that it is a complaint as he filed on the inmate complaint form. >> And specifically, it was a complaint the search of his cell phone by the state police and specifically you was in violation of his constitutional rights. Correct. >> That was his complaint. Yes. And that was directed both at the Indiana State Police and at you specifically, correct? amongst other agencies and entities. Yes. >> During your deposition on October 27, 2025, in this case, you were asked a large number of questions about your search of the cell phone. Correct. >> Correct. >> After the deposition was taken from you on October 27, 2025, you received a copy of the transcript. Correct. >> Yes. >> And you reviewed it? >> I did. including page 51. >> Yes. >> And including the question about whether any complaints had been made against you while an Indiana State Police officer. Correct. >> Yes. >> And we saw your answer. No. >> Correct. >> No formal complaints. Yes. >> And you didn't make any corrections to your deposition transcript, did you? >> Uh, I did not. >> Following the state's cross-examination of Sergeant Price and the defense's redirect, the testimony concluded and the parties presented their arguments to Judge Francisco on the motion to dismiss. All right. So, it's uncontested that this was not disclosed. Mr. Schmid, you're arguing that this is a Brady violation, right? >> Yes, your honor, in two respects. The first respect is that Sergeant Bryce gave false and inaccurate testimony at his October 27, 2025 deposition. Uh, the question that was asked of him asked whether any complaints had been filed against him while he was an Indiana State Police officer. He answered, "No, no formal complaints. In fact, that was untrue. A formal complaint had been filed against him in federal court." He was well aware of it. He reviewed the complaint itself. An answer was filed on his behalf. He answered interrogatories, signed interrogatories under oath, and also submitted a declaration. So, he submitted written testimony under oath in the case. And the case continued to pend through 2025. In fact, as far as officer Bryce note knew as of today's testimony, the case was still pending as far as he knew on October 27, 2025. In fact, the court had granted summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds, not reaching the merits of the lawsuit, but on qualified immunity grounds a month earlier. But Sergeant Bryce wasn't aware of that. So, as far as he knew, his last communication we now know being in June of 2025, he thought the lawsuit was still pending against him. Yet, he didn't disclose that. So, his testimony was false. And we believe that his false testimony should have been disclosed to the defense because less than two weeks later in an evidentiary hearing, Sergeant Bryce became a critical witness for the state. uh so critical that his testimony and his name was referenced 25 times in your honor's order deciding the motion. He was a central witness because it was plain from the evidence submitted at the evidentary hearing that materials outside the initial cell phone search warrant were reviewed and seen by the state police. The state defended on the ground that Sergeant Bryce had seen this in plain view, that he'd come across it inadvertently as he was starting to review the material on November 8, 2024. His credibility, his testimony was critical, and the defense at the November 7, 2025 hearing was completely denied the opportunity to cross-examine him on the ground that he had given false testimony in his deposition. The state police and specifically investigator Bryce knew that his testimony was false and that he had in fact been sued in connection with what was alleged to have been an illegal search of a defendant's cell phone. Very similar allegation to what has been alleged in this case in the defense motion to suppress. We believe that these Brady violations were obvious and egregious. They were material. Impeachment of a key witness in a matter is always material. Uh the state suppressed the evidence. Another requirement for a Brady violation because it didn't disclose the evidence to us regarding the Hecky lawsuit or the false testimony of Sergeant Bryce at the deposition on October 27, 2025. The material was clearly exculpatory in the sense that it would have provided powerful impeachment evidence of Sergeant Bryce if we had been properly made aware of it prior to November 7, 2025. We were not made aware of it, as was the state's obligation. There is no more fundamental rule in criminal law than the state's obligation to turn over exculpatory and impeachment evidence. and we were denied the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Sergeant Bryce in the evidentiary hearing in this case because of the egregious Brady violations. Your honor, we believe that it's appropriate to dismiss the remainder of this criminal case. Mr. Schmid argues that the state's failure to disclose both the Hec lawsuit and Sergeant Bryce's allegedly false deposition testimony constituted so-called Brady violations. In the 1963 case of Brady v. Maryland. The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court extended that rule in the 1972 case of Giggliov. United States, concluding that when the reliability of a witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, evidence affecting that witness's credibility falls within Brady's disclosure requirement. Importantly, in the 1995 case of Kyle's v. Whitley, the Supreme Court clarified that the prosecution's disclosure obligation extends beyond information in the prosecutor's personal possession, as the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf, including the police. Which is why Mr. Lutrol's unawareness of the Hec lawsuit did not resolve the question. Here, Mr. Schmidt argued that both pieces of withheld information were quote unquote impeachment evidence that called Sergeant Bryce's credibility into question. The lawsuit accused Sergeant Bryce of the same type of unlawful cell phone search at issue in Mr. Kosas' suppression motion. And the deposition answer showed a willingness to give false testimony under oath. Because Sergeant Bryce was the state's central witness at the suppression hearing and the only witness who could describe how he came across the disputed material, Mr. Schmid contended that the defense was denied a powerful avenue for challenging his credibility at the hearing where that credibility mattered most. >> The law also says, Mr. Schmid, that Brady violations are to be determined after trial. We don't even right now. The posture is Brady violation occurred because you were denied the ability to cross-examine Sergeant Bryce at the evidentary hearing on the motion to suppress. Correct? >> Yes, your honor. So I guess the question becomes this. When would the point be in the timeline, Mr. Schmid, when this should been disclosed to you? It seems to me that you think it should have been disclosed after the deposition, but before the evidentiary hearing so that you could have a gotcha moment with Sergeant Bryce, but are you really saying it should have been disclosed before the deposition? I mean, at what point does it become Brady or constitutional versus just discovery? that's ongoing between the parties. What is the line that you want this court to draw? >> Your honor, I think it would have been good prosecutorial practice for the Hecky lawsuit to have been disclosed to the defense prior to the deposition on October 27, 2025. That would have been standard practice, but it wasn't. But at the very least, uh, it should have been disclosed prior to the November 7, 2025 hearing because the state knew that it would be calling Sergeant Bryce as a key witness to underpin its plain view argument, which is an exception that was an attempt to salvage what was clearly a search beyond the terms of the search warrant. So, the state knew what it was arguing. plain view knew that Sergeant Bryce was the critical central witness and knew we were having an evidentiary hearing. I would argue that the relevant time for production of the false statement by Sergeant Bryce and the Hecky lawsuit that was not prior to the criminal trial itself, but for what it pertained to as him being a key witness. And we are entitled to Brady Gigglio material on the state's witnesses prior to hearings. whether that's a trial or a pre-trial hearing. And the state violated its disclosure obligations at the very least by not disclosing that in advance of November 7, 2025. I've read this order now a lot and obviously I know what the court was thinking behind the order as the author of the order. The issue on the plain view, Mr. Schmid was corroborated, was it not, by the text exchange between Sergeant Bryce and Detective Hostettler on or about November 8th, 2024? I think the issue you were raising was, well, when was this discovered? How was it discovered? So, how does this impact that evidence? Sergeant Bryce testified, your honor, that he inadvertently saw the reference in the snapshot of text messaging. We have to rely on his word and his word alone for what he saw and how he saw it. And we were denied an obvious impeachment avenue. A witness who has just lied two weeks before about an important material matter. The credibility of that witness is obviously would be severely adversely affected if the court knew on November 7th that he had lied in his deposition and given false testimony. Because Sergeant Bryce's testimony was critical and he was the only witness, the only witness the state had as to how he first saw that screenshot. We had to take him at his word that it popped up inadvertently, that he didn't blow it up, that he didn't take specific steps to try to see it, and even though he knew it was clearly outside the scope of the search warrant, that somehow it was inadvertently seen by him, we had to take him at his absolute word and your honor relied on his word. The defense was denied the ability to impeach his testimony with the obvious impeachment that he had lied about an important material matter just 2 weeks before under oath. And I would have argued at the time that the court should not believe him. I was denied that opportunity. I didn't attack his credibility because I didn't have the information and evidence to attack his credibility at the hearing. The text messages merely confirm that he eventually saw the information, the screenshot, but it doesn't confirm how he got to that. And that was the critical part of the court's analysis. How did it happen? I can't recreate the cross-examination of Sergeant Bryce after the fact cuz he's already made his impression on you. I can't undo your honor's mindset with respect to his testimony. that that horse has left the barn and we can't put it back in. I guess the fundamental question is, your honor, if due process is to mean anything, do we want criminal prosecutors to withhold critical information that a key witness has lied in sworn testimony in a case? This is not an obscure lie in another case that was not disclosed. This was a lie by a key witness two weeks before a central evidentiary hearing. Do we want prosecutors to withhold that information? Is that what we want the law to be? And if we don't want that to be the law, if we want prosecutors to be acting in the way that they should, which is the pursuit of justice, not just a win, then the correct remedy we believe is dismissal of the case. Because we don't want our prosecutors withholding that kind of critical impeachment information. But I would ask before you decide that issue, how do you want your prosecutors to act in your courtroom? How do you want them to act in the criminal cases that you oversee? I think that's the fundamental question. And I suspect that you want them to be above board and to be diligent to uncover exculpatory and impeachment evidence. You know, frankly, your honor, I'm quite tired, and I'm not blaming Mr. Latrell, but I'm quite tired of hearing prosecutors tell me, "Uh, we weren't aware of that information." Well, frankly, that's not good enough. Prosecutors are obligated to find out the information and to disclose it to the defense. Prosecutors can't bury their head in the sand and not ask their witnesses, you know, and failed to ask them, "Any complaints been made against you? Anyone accused you of constitutional violations before? Anyone accused you of lying? You ever been disciplined for lying before?" In in some prosecutor's offices, your honor, th those questions are embodied in formal forms that a prosecutor has to ask his law enforcement witnesses, in fact, all of his witnesses before they testify at any hearing. That should be and frankly is the standard. And whether Mr. Latrell knew it or not. And I'm not saying he actually knew it, but he's deemed to have knowledge of it. The good practice is find out the exculpatory and information and impeaching information, disclose it. Right? I'm not asking to reopen and get a second crack at the apple. I'm just saying what should be the appropriate sanction for an obvious disclosure violation by the state. And I'm just saying an ob one additional remedy that your honor could consider short of outright dismissal of the whole case is to strike Sergeant Bryce's testimony. I believe that in that instance, your honor would then grant in full the defendant's suppression motion because there'd be no plain view to rely on. Uh but it is an alternative sanction short of full dismissal, outright dismissal of the case and I would ask for it. >> Mr. Schmid requests that the court dismiss the case outright or in the alternative strike Sergeant Bryce's testimony from the suppression hearing. To strike testimony is to remove it from the record for purposes of the court's decision. Meaning the court treats the testimony as though it was never given and may not rely on it in ruling on the underlying issue. Striking the testimony would not necessarily end the prosecution, but it would carry significant consequences for the state's position on suppression. as Sergeant Bryce was the only witness who could establish that the disputed material was discovered inadvertently and in plain view. Without his testimony, the state's plain view argument for admission would be left without evidentiary support, which Mr. Schmid argued would require the court to grant the motion to suppress in full. In Indiana, the state's disclosure obligations are codified in rule 25 of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule requires the state to disclose any material or information within its possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or would tend to reduce the punishment and separately requires the state to furnish the defense before the trial date with any record of prior criminal convictions or other evidence that may be used to impeach the persons that the state intends to call as witnesses. These obligations are continuing with each party required to disclose supplemental discovery within a reasonable time. Now, on the question of remedy, the rule provides that any violation may result in a sanction deemed appropriate by the court. Language that vests the trial court with broad discretion to fashion a response proportionate to the harm. That discretion encompasses a wide range of options from ordering disclosure and granting a continuence to permitting reopened cross-examination to excluding or striking the affected testimony with dismissal sitting at the far end of the spectrum as the most severe sanction available. Here, Mr. Schmid's alternative request to strike the testimony asks the court to deprive the state of the benefit that it obtained from the undisclosed impeachment evidence rather than to end the prosecution altogether. >> The court needs to make a decision determination aided by council as to whether or not this is a significant issue that causes the court to rethink its order on the motion to suppress. The court did not enter that order based upon a mood or your ethereal impressions of the witness or you you looked at the whole picture, all the testimony, the direct and cross-examination, and you entered an order. Now, you've been provided new information, information that the state would respectfully suggest is immaterial. A prosay defendant sitting in federal prison lawsuit allegation unfounded is not impeachment evidence. But let's assume that it should be considered by you. You can now consider it and think about does this affect how I viewed the evidence. That's the best way to address this. not with a a limitation on the officer's testimony or to redo the whole thing or to dismiss the case. But the court has the both the mental faculties and the experience to simply look at this new information which the defense says is both reprehensible and very significant and the state says is immaterial and to see does it affect the court's judgment. I do want to state for the record I was unaware of this lawsuit until Mr. Schmid brought it to my attention in January. >> To be clear, Mr. Lill, I wanted that clear on the record, too. I don't think anybody is sitting here accusing you of misconduct. Secondly, I want to thank you, your honor, but I I I also want to assert that the answer that the court heard today is uh by all accounts by the evidence that's before the court is a fair and um reasonable explanation for why the answer was given the way it was. uh at the conclusion of a lengthy deposition. Court's order on your motion will be issued on or before June 1st. >> The court took the matter under advisement and on June 1st, Judge Francisco denied the motion to dismiss. As of the date of writing this episode, the case is still pending and is scheduled for a status hearing on June 12th, 2026. This hearing illustrates the gap between establishing that something went wrong and determining what a court should do about it. The state's disclosure obligation under Brady is among the most fundamental in criminal law and it does not depend on the prosecutor's personal knowledge because the prosecution is charged with learning of impeachment information known to the officers on whom its case depends. A law enforcement witness who gives an inaccurate answer under oath and who reviews the transcript without correcting it hands the defense exactly the kind of credibility evidence that the disclosure obligation exists to protect. But the remedy is a separate question from the violation and courts approach the two with very different postures. A motion to dismiss asks a court to end a prosecution without ever testing the charges, and judges must reserve that outcome for misconduct that cannot be cured by anything less. Judge Francisco's questions from the bench captured the tension. The same judge who authored the suppression order and who relied on Sergeant Bryce's testimony in doing so was being asked to decide whether new information about that witness changed how the evidence should be viewed and whether the failure to disclose it crossed the line from a discovery dispute into a constitutional violation. Let us know if there is a case or courtroom interaction that you would like us to explore in the comments below. Thank you for watching and don't forget to like and subscribe so we can help foster a more informed society.